Four Engines Were Frowned Upon
One of the uphill battles BAe faced was that operating four engines seemed ludicrous and expensive, and airlines weren’t shy to share that fact. BAe always came armed with cost and operating statistics to demonstrate that the aircraft was just as inexpensive to operate as a twin-engine aircraft and that the economics were better than even turboprop aircraft.
One of the launch carriers for the larger BAe 146-200 bought the aircraft to transition from turboprop aircraft. Over time, that carrier, Air Wisconsin, would not only be the launch customer for the even larger BAe 146-300 but eventually transition to all jet aircraft. Proof the BAe 146 was not a carrier killer as it became referred to in the late 80s after many startups bought the BAe 146 and went out of business. Poor business planning on the carrier’s part and BAe’s desperation to sell aircraft resulted in choices that made the 146 and BAe look bad, as if the aircraft were to blame. It’s a long and complicated story, for sure.
US Order Lights a Pathway to Moderate Success
It wouldn’t be until late 1983 that a US-based low-fare carrier came in and brought attention to the four-engine jetliner. California-based Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) was torn between upsizing to Boeing 757s, McDonnell Douglas MD-90s (long before the MD-90 was even launched), and even the Airbus A300, each of these manufacturers pushing bigger and farther-flying aircraft to the low-cost leader. But PSA, in a complete 180-degree turn, opted for smaller aircraft, with the BAe 146 securing an order for 20 aircraft with options for 25 more. The BAe 146 served two purposes at PSA: slot into the heavily traveled routes at lower demand times and to open markets where noise was an issue.
PSA Decides to Go Small (and Quiet)
PSA ran a flight between Los Angeles and San Francisco every 30 minutes like a bus line. Larger MD-80s ran the hourly (e.g., 6:00pm) flights, while the 146 would slot in on half-hour (e.g., 6:30pm) or later flights with less demand. But the quietness, something most airlines didn’t need per se, opened brand new markets for PSA. One of those was Orange County Airport (SNA), which had noise measuring devices at the end of the runway and in neighborhoods post-runway, and the 146 failed to register on either noise device.
The hometown airline, AirCal, had just purchased and taken delivery of brand new Boeing 737-300 aircraft that could not depart SNA with a full load without triggering the noise sensors. Therefore, the 737 was limited to the number of flight slots provided to each airline and ran payload restricted. These were very limited, and violation of the noise sensor would result in financial penalties or loss of a slot.
The BAe 146 Finds a Niche in California
The 146 was so quiet and registered below the threshold of the noise sensors that it was technically permitted ‘unlimited flights,’ unlike the carrier’s MD-80s and other airlines’ DC-9s and 737s. AirCal was ticked, but in the end, it purchased six 146s just to keep PSA from taking business from them. There are so many stories about PSA and AirCal battling it out that a complete chapter covers it in detail in my new book.
The 146 got a negative reputation amongst carriers in the 1980s, and they had many issues with the engines, which were ironically not British at all but American-designed and built by Avco Lycoming. The powerplant was originally a vertical lift turbine engine used on helicopters that was further developed as a jet transport engine. When the HS146 launched, the plan was to have Rolls Royce develop the engine. However, Rolls-Royce was just exiting bankruptcy after government intervention and was overwhelmed with the RB211 for the Lockheed L-1011 and the Olympus engine for Concorde. It just didn’t have the ability to support yet another new powerplant.
The Avco solution required four engines, not two, to provide the lift needed for the 146. But Avco’s inexperience with scheduled commercial jets and the airline business in general, not to mention BAe’s lack of customer service (the complete opposite of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas at the time), soured many operators on the aircraft, as well as potential operators who’ve all heard the acronyms for BAe: “Bring another engine” or “1-4-sick.”
