Top Gun Has Been Making Enemies Squirm Since the 60s

Fighter Weapons School at Miramar Turned Good Fighter Pilots into Great Fighter Pilots.

On 3 March 1969 the United States Navy established its Fighter Weapons School at Naval Air Station Miramar outside of San Diego in California. You know the school better as TOP GUN. The school began producing pilots and crews with much improved air combat maneuvering (ACM) skills, who were then able to pass their knowledge on to their squadron mates. TOP GUN also spawned a woefully inaccurate but nonetheless popular 80s movie. But how much do you really know about TOP GUN?

Figuring Out Why Naval Aviators Had Lost the Edge

In 1968, United States Navy Captain Frank Ault was directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral and Naval Aviator Thomas Moorer, to look into the reasons why the Navy was losing so many aircraft and experienced crews in the skies over Vietnam. More specifically, Moorer and the Navy High Brass were concerned that having procured a fighter aircraft that was not armed with guns might have been a blunder. The Navy and Marine F-4 Phantom IIs were just not scoring kills with their primary (and in most cases only) weapon- the air-to-air missile. Ault’s charter was to figure out why and to propose potential fixes.

The Numbers Didn’t Lie

Consider this: Between 2 March 1965 and 1 November 1968 (the days of Operation Rolling Thunder) the United States lost nearly 1000 aircraft in roughly 1 million sorties. Even though both the Navy and Air Force losses were included in these telling statistics, the reasons for the losses were not interpreted by the Navy and the Air Force the same way.

The Air Force Opinion

Although the Air Force had not commissioned a formal study into the abysmal performance during Rolling Thunder, the Air Force nonetheless came to the conclusion that their losses came about because Vietnamese MiGs, operating primarily at the direction of ground controllers, were routinely being steered by those controllers into positions from which they were both unobserved before they attacked, and most often attacked from behind the Air Force jets. The Air Force interpreted the data and decided that their losses were primarily due to technology.

Air Force Solutions Adopted By All Branches

In order to address what they believed were equipment shortcomings, the Air Force specified and procured the F-4E variant of the Phantom II. The F-4E added an internal M61 Vulcan multi-barrel cannon, additional internal fuel capacity, improved radar homing and warning (RHAW) equipment, more powerful engines, leading-edge maneuvering slats, and more reliable targeting systems for the radar-guided AIM-7 Sparrow and heat-seeking AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. The Air Force also worked with the missile manufacturers to improve quality control during the manufacturing process, which benefitted all parties. The Navy would eventually incorporate some of these improvements into later variants of their Phantom IIs, but did not adopt an internal cannon. Every fighter aircraft developed after the F-4 incorporated an internal gun of some kind.

The Ault Report Reached Different Conclusions

Captain Ault published his report in May of 1968. He reached the conclusion that inadequate air combat maneuvering (ACM) training was the root of the problem. Although he interpreted the poor results attained using the missiles the same way the Air Force did, Ault believed Navy and Marine aircrews were being adequately trained only to maneuver into position to fire their missiles at targets but not in the kind of frenetic maneuvering then taking place in the skies over Vietnam. His conclusions were seconded by the pilots flying the Vought F-8 Crusader. Equipped with four 20 millimeter cannon but a handful to maneuver effectively, the F-8 would also reward pilots who practiced ACM on a regular basis.

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